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I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2013, in Aransas Project v. Shaw,
1
 the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas announced, almost in passing, that the 
Federal Endangered Species Act (ESA)
2
 preempts state water law and 
the exercise of state water rights.
3
  As a result, the court concluded that 
the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality had effectuated a 
“taking”
4
 of ESA-listed whooping cranes as a result of state-permitted 
diversions of fresh water.
5
  This case is currently on review before the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but it raises a question likely 
to be increasingly important for both aquatic species and water users: 
When, and to what extent, does the Federal ESA preempt state water 
law, including the exercise of state-created water rights? 
This Article examines that question in much more detail than the 
Southern District of Texas did.  It begins by examining the plethora of 
water systems in the U.S. that are already subject to ESA controversies 
as a result, at least in part, of water management decisions and water 
rights.  For a variety of reasons, including both population dynamics and 
climate change, the number of such systems is increasing, and conflicts 
between the ESA and state water law are only likely to escalate in the 
future.  In Part III, this Article reviews the basic jurisprudence of federal 
preemption, outlining the three ways in which federal law can preempt 
state law—express, implied, and conflict preemption.  Finally, Part IV 
examines how these three types of preemption play out through the ESA.  
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 1.  930 F. Supp. 2d 716 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 2.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
 3.  Aransas Project, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 745, 783–84. 
 4.  The ESA prohibits takings of listed species through Section 9.  16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012). 
 5.  Aransas Project, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 786–88. 
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The Article concludes that the ESA is unlikely to either expressly or 
implicitly preempt state water law in most circumstances, but that 
conflict preemption is likely to play an increasingly bigger role in ESA-
water law jurisprudence, making Aransas Project v. Shaw a harbinger of 
water rights litigation to come. 
II. FRESH WATER, ESA-LISTED SPECIES, AND THE INCREASING 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN WATER MANAGEMENT AND THE ESA 
Perhaps surprisingly to some, most waters in the U.S. that are 
important sources of water supply, including groundwater aquifers, 
contain ESA-listed species.  In general, the connection is immediate and 
direct: the listed species depend for habitat on the same water humans 
want to consume—for drinking water, for irrigation, for industrial 
processes, for energy production, and for waste treatment.
6
  In addition, 
major water management projects for flood control, water storage, or 
hydropower can also interfere with species’ life cycles and habitats, 
promoting the ESA’s application. 
This section begins by providing an overview of the ESA itself, 
emphasizing how species are listed, what protections listed species 
receive, and how the ESA has already extensively interacted with 
freshwater management.  It then examines the increasing conflicts 
between the ESA and water law—first by examining four specific water 
systems and the conflicts that have arisen between the ESA and 
individual water rights (the Aransas Project v. Shaw conflict in Texas; 
the Sacramento-San Joaquin Bay Delta conflicts in California; the 
Klamath River conflicts in Oregon and California; and the Edwards 
Aquifer conflicts in Texas), then by providing a more nationwide 
overview of existing and emerging conflicts between the ESA and water 
management more generally.  As should be clear by the end of this 
discussion, conflicts between the ESA and water law are both common 
and increasing, with no simple resolution in sight. 
                                                          
 6.  See generally David E. Filippi, The Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Water Rights 
and Water Use, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22 (2002) (providing an overview of how state water 
law can conflict with the ESA). 
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A. An Overview of the ESA 
1. Listing Species for Protection Under Section 4 
Unlike for many environmental statutes, application of the ESA to 
any particular situation is managerially deliberate, in the sense that the 
ESA does not apply to any species or any situation until one of two 
“expert” agencies lists a species for protection using notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.
7
  The two listing agencies are the U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service (USFWS), which implements the ESA for terrestrial and 
freshwater species on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior; and the 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), also known as NOAA 
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) Fisheries, which 




Section 4 of the ESA governs species listings.
9
  To list a species, the 
USFWS or NMFS must determine, “solely on the basis of the best 
scientific and commercial data available to [it] after conducting a review 
of the status of the species,”
10
 whether any of five statutory factors exist 
and are threatening the species under consideration: 
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment 
of its habitat or range; 
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or 
educational purposes; 
(C) disease or predation; 
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or 




If the agency decides to list a species for the ESA’s protections, it 
must also make two other decisions.  First, the agency must designate the 
                                                          
 7.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3) (2012). 
 8.  See id. §§ 1532(15) (defining “Secretary” and referencing the Reorganization Plan that 
divides and assigns these responsibilities), 1533(a) (assigning listing responsibility to the 
“Secretary”). 
 9.  Id. § 1533. 
 10.  Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A). 
 11.  Id. § 1533(a)(1)(A)–(E). 
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species as either “endangered” or “threatened.”
12
  An “endangered 
species” is “any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or 
a significant portion of its range,” except for certain insect pests.
13
  A 
“threatened species,” in turn, is “any species which is likely to become 
an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a 
significant portion of its range.”
14
 
Second, at the same time that they list species as endangered or 
threatened, the USFWS and NMFS are supposed to designate species’ 
critical habitat.
15
  “Critical habitat” is: 
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the 
species, at the time it is listed . . . , on which are found those physical or 
biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and 
(II) which may require special management considerations or 
protection; and 
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species 
at the time it is listed . . . , upon a determination by the Secretary that 
such areas are essential for the conservation of the species.
16
 
Critical habitat cannot include “the entire geographical area which 
can be occupied by the threatened or endangered species”
17
 or 
Department of Defense lands subject to a natural resources management 
plan,
18
 and the listing agency can consider many other factors besides 
science when designating critical habitat—“the economic impact, the 
impact on national security, and any other relevant impact . . . .”
19
  
Nevertheless, critical habitat designations must promote the listed 
species’ “conservation,” which requires the expert agencies to use “all 
methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered 
species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided 
pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary.”
20
 
With respect to the intersection of the ESA and water law, ESA-
listed species have a strong aquatic bent.  Although the number of 
species listed is subject to constant revision, the USFWS and NMFS 
                                                          
 12.  Id. § 1533(a)(1), (a)(3)(A). 
 13.  Id. § 1532(6). 
 14.  Id. § 1532(20). 
 15.  Id. § 1533(a)(3). 
 16.  Id. § 1532(5)(A). 
 17.  Id. § 1532(5)(C). 
 18.  Id. § 1533(a)(3)(B)(i). 
 19.  Id. § 1533(b)(2). 
 20.  Id. § 1532(3). 
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have listed over 1300 species as of late 2013, which includes species 
located in foreign countries.
21
  Of the listed species that live within the 




 and 88 clams.
24
  Beyond these 
categories of species that are inherently directly dependent on water, a 
number of the 88 species of ESA-listed mammals, 96 species of ESA-
listed birds, 46 species of ESA-listed snails, 71 species of ESA-listed 
insects, 24 species of ESA-listed crustaceans, and 30 species of ESA-
listed ferns,
25
 among others, are directly or indirectly dependent on 
aquatic ecosystems and habitats.  Thus, the listing process sets the stage 
for conflicts between listed species’ needs for fresh water and human 
desires to manage and use that same water. 
2. Section 7 and Federal Agencies’ Duties Toward Listed Species 
Once the USFWS or NMFS lists a species under the ESA, the 





  Section 7 imposes two significant conservation 
requirements on all federal agencies.  First, under Section 7(a)(1), all 
“Federal agencies shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of 
the [expert agencies], utilize their authorities in furtherance of the 
purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation of 
endangered species and threatened species listed” under Section 4.
28
  As 
noted, this duty to conserve listed species requires federal agencies to use 
“all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any 
endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the 
                                                          
 21.  Listing Species Under the Endangered Species Act, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/biodiversity/endangered_species_act/listing_species_u
nder_the_endangered_species_act/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
 22.  Environmental Conservation Online System: Species ad hoc Search: U.S. Fishes, U.S. FISH 
& WILDLIFE SERV., http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/SpeciesReport.do?groups=E&listingType= 
L&mapstatus=1 (last updated Oct. 28, 2013). 
 23.  Environmental Conservation Online System: Species ad hoc Search: U.S. Amphibians, U.S. 
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/SpeciesReport.do?groups=D&listing 
Type=L&mapstatus=1 (last updated Oct. 28, 2013). 
 24.  Environmental Conservation Online System: Species ad hoc Search: U.S. Clams, U.S. FISH 
& WILDLIFE SERV., http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/SpeciesReport.do?groups=F&listingType= 
L&mapstatus=1 (last updated Oct. 28, 2013). 
 25.  See Endangered Species: U.S. Species, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/ 
endangered/species/us-species.html (last updated Oct. 28, 2013) (providing numbers of endangered 
and threatened species in the U.S.). 
 26.  16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012). 
 27.  Id. § 1538. 
 28.  Id. § 1536(a)(1). 
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measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary,”
29
 
including in the water management context. 
For example, federal agencies have used Section 7(a)(1) to justify 
shifting water in federal reclamation projects from human use to the 
needs of listed species.  Thus, when the Secretary of the Interior refused 
to sell water from the Stampede Dam and Reservoir in Nevada for 
municipal and industrial use in order to keep additional water in the 
system to benefit the ESA-listed cui-ui fish and Lahontan cutthroat trout, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld that decision 
under Section 7(a)(1), concluding that the Secretary was not required to 
sell the water under the authorizing Washoe Project Act and that Section 




Citizens have also used Section 7(a)(1) to force federal agencies to 
manage water and other programs for the better benefit of ESA-listed 
species.
31
  For example, in Sierra Club v. Glickman,
32
 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) had failed to comply with Section 7(a)(1) with 
respect to the USDA’s various crop subsidy programs because: (1) 
Section 7(a)(1) imposes an affirmative duty on federal agencies to 
conserve ESA-listed species;
33
 (2) the USDA had never consulted with 
the USFWS regarding the effects of the USDA’s crop subsidy programs 
on five ESA-listed species (“the fountain darter, the San Marcos 
gambusia (which may now be extinct), the San Marcos salamander, the 
Texas blind salamander, and Texas wild rice”)
34
 that depend on the 
Edwards Aquifer in Texas, which the farmers were using as a source of 
irrigation water;
35
 and (3) the USDA was not using its authorities to 
conserve these five species.
36
 
                                                          
 29.  Id. § 1532(3). 
 30.  Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 259–63 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 31.  The ESA contains a citizen-suit provision, which allows “any person” to bring suit “to 
enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or 
agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or any regulation issued 
under the authority thereof . . . .”  16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2012).  In addition, against federal 
agencies, citizens also often have a cause of action under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act’s 
(APA’s) judicial review provisions.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012) (detailing when suits against 
federal agencies are allowed). 
 32.  156 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1998).  
 33.  Id. at 616. 
 34.  Id. at 610. 
 35.  Id. at 618. 
 36.  Id. at 617–18. Cf. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 898 F.2d 
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Second, Section 7(a)(2) imposes even more extensive consultation 
and species protection requirements on federal agencies.  Specifically: 
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance 
of the [expert agencies], insure that any action authorized, funded, or 
carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as an 
“agency action”) is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of 
any endangered species or threatened species or result in the 
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is 
determined . . . to be critical, unless such agency has been granted an 
exemption for such action by the Committee pursuant to subsection (h) 
of this section.  In fulfilling the requirements of this paragraph the 
agency shall use the best scientific and commercial data available.
37
 
Under the USFWS’s and NMFS’s joint regulations for Section 7, to 
“[j]eopardize the continued existence of means to engage in an action 
that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce 
appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed 
species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution 
of that species.”
38
  However, as Section 7(a)(2) notes, any federal agency 
can apply for an exemption from these requirements through the 
Endangered Species Committee (also known as the “God Squad”),
39
 but 
the criteria for such exemptions are strict,
40
 few such exemptions have 
been granted, and the Committee has never allowed a federal agency to 
drive a species to extinction.
41
 
                                                          
1410, 1417–18 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that, when the Navy did consult with the USFWS regarding 
the effects, on ESA-listed fish, of its leasing of acreage and water rights to local farmers, it retained 
discretion regarding how exactly it would comply with Section 7(a)(1) and did not have to 
implement the option that was least burdensome to the fish).  See also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. 
Norton, 332 F. Supp. 2d 170, 187–88 (D.D.C. 2004) (concluding that the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers had developed a program to conserve ESA-listed Florida panthers that complied with 
Section 7(a)(1) in connection with its issuance of a Clean Water Act “dredge and fill” permit for a 
limestone mine); Protect Our Water v. Flowers, 377 F. Supp. 2d 844, 869–70 (E.D. Cal. 2004) 
(concluding that the Army Corps had complied with Section 7(a)(1) with respect to the ESA-listed 
red-legged frog and kit fox when it issued a dredge and fill permit); Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 
268 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1273 (D. Or. 2003) (holding that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) was adequately using its Clean Water Act authorities to comply with Section 7(a)(1) when the 
EPA was participating in six multispecies water conservation programs to benefit ESA-listed salmon 
and trout in the Columbia and Willamette Rivers in Oregon). 
 37.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
 38.  50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2013). 
 39.  See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1536 
(9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the Endangered Species Committee is “known popularly as ‘The God 
Squad’”). 
 40.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (2012). 
 41.  ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT 350–52 (3d ed. 2012) 
 
  
858 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
Section 7(a)(2) also imposes procedural requirements on federal 
agencies.
42
  When a federal agency is contemplating an action, it first 
engages in informal consultation with the two expert agencies.
43
  The 
purpose of informal consultation is to figure out whether the agency 
action might affect ESA-listed species.
44
  As the USFWS explains, “If it 
appears that the agency’s action may affect a listed species, that agency 
may then prepare a biological assessment to assist in its determination of 
the project’s effect on a species.”
45
  If one of the expert agencies 
determines that the proposed agency action is likely to adversely affect 
ESA-listed species, formal consultation begins.
46
  During formal 
consultation, the relevant expert agency produces a formal Biological 
Opinion stating its conclusions as to whether the proposed action will 
jeopardize any species or damage or destroy its critical habitat, 
suggesting reasonable and prudent alternatives if necessary to avoid 
violating Section 7(a)(2), and providing the action agency with an 
Incidental Take Statement, if necessary, to insulate the action agency 
from liability under Section 9.
47
 
Section 7(a)(2) has been, by far, the most litigated provision of the 
ESA, and its applicability can significantly affect water management in 
systems where there are federal dams or reclamation projects or other 
kinds of federal “handles.”
48
  Notably, the first major ESA case that the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
49
 was a 
Section 7(a)(2) case involving the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA’s) 
construction of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River.
50
  
According to the best science available at the time, completion of the 
                                                          
(describing the amendments that created the Endangered Species Committee and the history of the 
use of this exemption process). 
 42.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
 43.  Section 7 Consultation: A Brief Explanation, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/section7/section7.html (last updated Oct. 24, 2012). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id.  See also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (2012) (describing the biological assessment and its 
role in the consultation process). 
 46.  Section 7 Consultation: A Brief Explanation, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/section7/section7.html (last updated Oct. 24, 2012). 
 47.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (2012). 
 48.  See James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup 
Look from a Litigator’s Perspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499, 525 (1991) (stating that ESA Section 7(a)(2) 
is “undoubtedly the most well-known, and certainly the most frequently litigated, obligation 
pertaining to federal agencies”). 
 49.  437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 50.  Id. at 157. 
  
2014] DOES THE ESA PREEMPT STATE WATER LAW? 859 
dam would eradicate the newly ESA-listed snail darter, a small fish.
51
  
The Court concluded that, under the plain mandate of Section 7(a)(2), the 
TVA could not complete the dam.
52
 
While Congress later intervened specifically to allow the TVA to 
finish building Tellico Dam, Section 7(a)(2) remains an important 
component of legal conflicts between ESA-listed species and water 
management.
53
  Specifically, and to give some sense of the ESA’s 
influence in this context, Section 7(a)(2) has been instrumental in the 
evolution of water law-species conflicts in the Androscoggin River in 
Maine;
54
 Butte Creek in California;
55
 the multi-state Colorado River;
56
 
the Columbia River in Oregon, Washington, and Idaho;
57
 the Coosa 
River in Alabama and Georgia;
58
 the Cowlitz River in Washington;
59
 the 
Edwards Aquifer in Texas;
60
 the Everglades in Florida;
61
 Icicle Creek in 
Washington;
62
 Joe’s Branch in Alabama;
63
 the Klamath River Basin in 
                                                          
 51.  Id. at 171–72. 
 52.  Id. at 193–95. 
 53.  ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT 348–50 (3d ed. 2012) 
(describing the fate of the Tellico Dam in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision). 
 54.  See generally, e.g., Friends of Merrymeeting Bay v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 810 F. Supp. 
2d 320 (D. Me. 2011).  By design, this list focuses on water use as it is traditionally conceived in 
water law—that is, the withdrawal of water from a source and its application to some use, with or 
without return flow, or the physical control of waterways for human purposes.  Notably, however, 
water quality issues and water pollution can also create conflicts with ESA-listed species.  See, e.g., 
Dow AgroSciences LLC v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 707 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2013) (evaluating 
NMFS’s recent Biological Opinion concluding that use of certain pesticides near waterways 
jeopardizes several species of ESA-listed salmonids). 
 55.  See generally, e.g., Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 56.  See generally, e.g., Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 691 F.3d 1008 
(9th Cir. 2012); Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 623 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (D. Ariz. 
2009); Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. CV-07-8164 PCT-DGC, 2008 WL 
4417227 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2008); Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 
2003); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (D. Ariz. 
1997). 
 57.  See generally, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917 (9th 
Cir. 2008); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 175 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Or. 2011); Idaho 
Dept. of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Or. 1994). 
 58.  See generally, e.g., Ala. Power Co. v. FERC, 979 F.2d 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 59.  See generally, e.g., Cowlitz Indian Tribe v. FERC, 186 Fed. App’x 806 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 60.  See generally, e.g., Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 61.  See generally, e.g., Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 661 F.3d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2011); 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2009); Miccosukee 
Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 566 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2009); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 420 F. 
Supp. 2d 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2006). 
 62.  See generally, e.g., Wild Fish Conservancy v. Kempthorne, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (E.D. 
Wash. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar, 628 F.3d 513 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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California and Oregon;
64
 Lake Earl and Lake Talawa in California;
65
 the 
Little Truckee River in Nevada;
66





 the Muddy River/Warm Springs Area in 
Nevada;
69
 the Platte River in Nebraska;
70
 Pyramid Lake in Nevada;
71
 the 
Rio Grande River in New Mexico;
72
 the Salmon River Basin in Idaho;
73
 
the Sacramento–San Joaquin Bay Delta in California;
74
 the San Pedro 
River in Arizona;
75
 the South Yuba River in California;
76
 Wildcat Creek 
                                                          
 63.  See generally, e.g., D’Olive Bay Restoration & Pres. Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (S.D. Ala. 2007). 
 64.  See generally, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Pac. Coast Fed’n of 
Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005); Kandra v. United 
States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2001). 
 65.  See generally, e.g., Pac. Shores Subdivision Cal. Water Dist. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 538 F. Supp. 2d 242 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 66.  See generally, e.g., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th 
Cir. 1984). 
 67.  See generally, e.g., San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc’y v. FERC, 242 Fed. App’x 462 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
 68.  See generally, e.g., In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005); 
Am. Rivers v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 271 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 69.  See generally, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 900 F. Supp. 
2d 1151 (D. Nev. 2012). 
 70.  See generally, e.g., Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. FERC, 
962 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 71.  See generally, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 898 F.2d 
1410 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 72.  See generally, e.g., Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096 
(10th Cir. 2010). 
 73.  See generally, e.g., W. Watersheds Project v. Matejko, 468 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 74.  See generally, e.g., NRDC v. Salazar, 686 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2012); San Luis & Delta-
Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011); NRDC v. Hous., 146 F.3d 1118 
(9th Cir. 1998); In re Consol. Salmonid Cases, 791 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Coal. for a 
Sustainable Delta v. FEMA, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2011); San Luis & Delta-Mendota 
Water Auth. v. Salazar, 760 F. Supp. 2d 855 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Consol. Delta Smelt Cases, 717 F. 
Supp. 2d 1021 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Consol. Salmonid Cases, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (E.D. Cal. 2010); 
Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v. FEMA, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2010); San Luis & Delta-
Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (E.D. Cal. 2009); NRDC v. Kempthorne, 621 
F. Supp. 2d 954 (E.D. Cal. 2009); NRDC v. Kempthorne, No. 1:05–CV–01207 OWW TAG, 2008 
WL 5054115 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2008), superseded in part by NRDC v. Kempthorne, 621 F. Supp. 
2d 954 (E.D. Cal. 2009), and clarified by NRDC v. Kempthorne, 627 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (E.D. Cal. 
2009); Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (E.D. Cal. 2008); 
Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2008); NRDC 
v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. Cal. 2007); NRDC v. Rodgers, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1212 
(E.D. Cal. 2005); Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, 850 F. 
Supp. 1388 (E.D. Cal. 1994). 
 75.  See generally, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 804 F. Supp. 2d 987 (D. Ariz. 
2011); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 541 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (D. 
Ariz. 2008); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Ariz. 2002). 
 76.  See generally, e.g., S. Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 723 F. 
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in Colorado;
77
 and the Willamette River in Oregon.
78
 
3. The ESA’s Section 9 Prohibitions for Everyone 
The ESA’s second set of protections for listed species comes in 
Section 9, which contains lists of prohibited activities.  These 
prohibitions apply to “any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States,”
79
 with the ESA defining “person” to be: 
an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any other 
private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, or 
instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, 
or political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign government; any 
State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State; or any other 
entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
80
 
Section 9 is thus broadly applicable to all individuals, businesses, and 
governments operating within the U.S. 
“[W]ith respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife” listed 
under the ESA,
81
 Section 9 makes it unlawful for any person to: 
(A) import any such species into, or export any such species from the 
United States; 
(B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea 
of the United States; 
(C) take any such species upon the high seas; 
(D) possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship, by any means 
whatsoever, any such species taken in violation of subparagraphs (B) 
and (C); 
(E) deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or foreign 
commerce, by any means whatsoever and in the course of a commercial 
activity, any such species; 
(F) sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce any such 
species; or 
                                                          
Supp. 2d 1247 (E.D. Cal. 2010); S. Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 629 
F. Supp. 2d 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 77.  See generally, e.g., Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583 (D. Colo. 
1983). 
 78.  See generally, e.g., Audubon Soc’y of Portland v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 849 F. 
Supp. 2d 1017 (D. Or. 2011). 
 79.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 80.  Id. § 1532(13). 
 81.  Id. § 1538(a)(1). 
  
862 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
(G) violate any regulation pertaining to such species or to any 
threatened species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to [Section 4] and 




In turn, “with respect to any endangered species of plants,”
83
 Section 
9 makes it unlawful for any person to: 
(A) import any such species into, or export any such species from, the 
United States; 
(B) remove and reduce to possession any such species from areas under 
Federal jurisdiction; maliciously damage or destroy any such species on 
any such area; or remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy any such 
species on any other area in knowing violation of any law or regulation 
of any State or in the course of any violation of a State criminal 
trespass law; 
(C) deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or foreign 
commerce, by any means whatsoever and in the course of a commercial 
activity, any such species; 
(D) sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce any such 
species; or 
(E) violate any regulation pertaining to such species or to any 
threatened species of plants listed pursuant to [Section 4] and 




Finally, “[i]t is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States to attempt to commit, solicit another to commit, or cause to 
be committed, any offense defined in this section.”
85
 
Several aspects of Section 9’s prohibitions are worth further 
comment.  First, Section 9’s many restrictions on trade in listed species 
both help the U.S. to implement a number of international treaties related 
to wildlife, especially the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES), and acknowledge that 
trade can be a substantial driver of species extinctions.
86
  Second, Section 
                                                          
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. § 1538(a)(2). 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id. § 1538(g). 
 86.  See id. §§ 1531(a)(4) (listing the treaties that the ESA helps to implement), 1532(4) 
(defining “Convention” to mean CITES), 1538(c) (more explicitly prohibiting violations of CITES), 
1538(d) (requiring the Secretary’s permission to trade in species), 1538(f) (controlling ports of entry 
and export for trade in species). 
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9’s prohibitions apply to endangered species;
87
 the only prohibitions 
relevant to threatened species forbid violating the expert agencies’ 
regulations.
88
  This statutory distinction between threatened and 
endangered species acknowledges that USFWS and NMFS can write 
special regulations detailing the protections given or not given to 
threatened species, known as “Section 4(d) rules.”
89
  Nevertheless, as a 
result of the agencies’ default regulation, threatened species receive all of 
the same protections that endangered species do unless the relevant 
expert agency promulgates a special regulation.
90
  Finally, just as federal 
agencies can receive permission to incidentally take listed species 
through the Section 7 consultation process, private individuals and 
entities and non-federal governments can acquire, pursuant to Section 10, 
a variety of different permits that allow activities that would otherwise 
violate Section 9.
91
  The most important of these is the Incidental Take 
Permit,
92
 but permits are also available for scientific research,
93
 to relieve 
hardships created by a species’ listing,
94
 for subsistence hunting by 
Alaska Natives,
95
 for trade in pre-ESA artifacts,
96




Outside of actual trade in species, the Section 9 prohibition that has 
received the most legal attention is the prohibition on “take.”  The ESA 
defines “take” to mean “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”
98
  
Of particular importance in the water context (and many other contexts), 
the expert agencies have defined “harm” to be “an act which actually 
kills or injures wildlife.  Such act may include significant habitat 
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by 
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, 
                                                          
 87.  Id. § 1538(a)(1)–(2). 
 88.  Id. § 1538(a)(1)(G), (2)(E). 
 89.  See id. § 1533(d). 
 90.  50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a), (c) (2013).  The USFWS’s special 4(d) rules are codified at id. §§ 
17.40 to 17.48; for an example of a NMFS 4(d) rule for salmon that accommodates tribal treaty 
fishing rights, see id. § 223.204. 
 91.  16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2012). 
 92.  Id. § 1539(a). 
 93.  Id. § 1539(a)(1)(A). 
 94.  Id. § 1539(b). 
 95.  Id. § 1539(e). 
 96.  Id. § 1539(f), (h). 
 97.  Id. § 1539(j). 
 98.  Id. § 1532(19). 
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feeding or sheltering.”
99
  In addition, because Section 9 prohibits 
attempts and solicitation, courts have concluded that it prohibits third-
party “takes” as well as direct takes.
100
  As a result, permitting 
agencies—such as state agencies that issue water rights—can be held 
responsible in some circumstances for the cumulative impact of the 
permitted private actions (such as water withdrawal and use) on ESA-
listed species.
101
  This was the legal context for the Aransas Project case, 
discussed in Subpart B below. 
Federal agencies, however, can also potentially run afoul of Section 
9 as a result of their water management.  For example, in the 
Apalachicola–Chattahoochee–Flint River (ACF) Basin shared among 
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, the U.S. Army Corps operates a number 
of dams.
102
  One of these, the Jim Woodruff Lock and Dam, sits at the 
border of Georgia and Florida, where the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers 
converge into the Apalachicola, which flows through the panhandle of 
Florida to the Gulf of Mexico, emptying at Apalachicola Bay.
103
  “Four 
federally-listed threatened and endangered species are present in the 
Apalachicola River downstream from Woodruff Dam: the threatened 
Gulf sturgeon, the endangered fat threeridge mussel, the threatened 




In the early years of the twenty-first century, during drought, the 
States of Alabama and Florida filed suit against the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, asserting that the Corps was allowing too little water to pass 
through the Woodruff Dam, killing ESA-listed mussels downstream and 
thus resulting in a “take” in violation of Section 9.
105
  The U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Alabama, however, concluded that 
Florida had failed to show the causation necessary to hold the Army 
Corps liable under the ESA.
106
  Notably, the court first concluded that 
                                                          
 99.  50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2013).  The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld this definition against a 
facial challenge.  Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 100.  E.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 101.  See id. at 165–66 (holding the Massachusetts state permitting agencies liable under Section 
9 for the cumulative impact of lobster pot fishermen on endangered Northern Right whales). 
 102.  Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125 (N.D. Ala. 2006). 
 103.  Id. at 1124–25. 
 104.  Id. at 1125. 
 105.  Id. at 1125–26.  See also Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 
2005). 
 106.  Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1132–35, 1138 (N.D. Ala. 
2006). 
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“[n]o one disputes that protected mussels are dying by the hundreds, that 
more will die at 5,000 cfs [‘cubic feet per second,’ a measure of water 
flow], and that their habitat is being modified by the decreased flows so 
that they are facing death, harm, and harassment.  Thus, the court finds 
that a take has occurred as that term is defined by” the ESA and its 
implementing regulations.
107
  However, despite the fact that the Army 
Corps controlled the flow of water through the Woodruff Dam, the court 
concluded that it had not caused the ESA take: 
Florida urges this court to find that the Corps’ choice as to the amount 
of water to retain upstream in storage versus the amount to release 
downstream to support protected mussels violates the anti-taking 
provision of the ESA.  The court is not convinced that the predicament 
faced by these protected mussels rests at the feet of the Corps.  Instead, 
the weight of evidence points to other causes for the exposure of the 
mussels and harm to their habitat.  No one disputes that the ACF basin 
suffers from severe drought conditions.  Evidence from FWS indicates 
that drought conditions have become more severe than droughts were 
in the years prior to the constructing of dams on these affected rivers.  
While the presence of these dams may have contributed in some ways 
to the effects of this year’s drought, Florida offered no evidence on this 
point.  Because of decreased rainfall and increased evaporation, the 
amount of water available in the ACF basin has fallen sharply.  The 
court cannot hold the Corps responsible for the absence of rain.
108
 
As a result, the court refused to preliminarily enjoin the Army Corps’s 
water management at the Woodruff Dam.
109
 
B. Water Rights, Water Management, and the ESA 
1. Example #1: The San Antonio & Guadalupe Rivers and Aransas 
Project v. Shaw 
As was true for the Army Corps in the ACF Basin, Section 9 
causation is the primary legal issue in Aransas Project v. Shaw,
110
 a case 
decided by the Southern District of Texas in March 2013.  This case 
involved the whooping crane population that winters at the Aransas 
National Wildlife Refuge in southern Texas (the AWB flock).
111
  The 
                                                          
 107.  Id. at 1132. 
 108.  Id. at 1134. 
 109.  Id. at 1137–38. 
 110.  930 F. Supp. 2d 716 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 111.  Id. at 722.  
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whooping crane was listed for protection under federal endangered 
species legislation that preceded the current ESA—as threatened in 
1967
112
 and as endangered in 1970.
113
  The Refuge is located in the 
Guadalupe Estuary, also known as San Antonio Bay, and its proper 
functioning as whooping crane habitat depends on freshwater flows from 
the Guadalupe and San Antonio Rivers.
114
  As the court described: 
The Refuge receives freshwater inflows from primarily two river 
sources, the San Antonio and the Guadalupe, each located to the north 
and slightly west of the area.  The San Antonio river flows into the 
Guadalupe river system, and the Guadalupe river flows directly into the 
Refuge, emptying into the San Antonio bay . . . .  The San Antonio and 
the Guadalupe river systems emerge from underground springs near 
San Antonio and run 250 miles southeast where they join together just 
before entering the San Antonio bay and flow into the AWB flock’s 
winter habitat, that extends slightly north of the Refuge.  These 




During the winter of 2008–2009, this area experienced severe drought.
116
  
By the end of the winter, according to the court, 23 AWB whooping 
cranes had died and another 34 that left the area in the spring failed to 
return in the fall.
117
 
According to the Southern District of Texas, the culprit, legally and 
factually, was the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), 
which has responsibility in Texas for allocating water rights.  As the 
district court explained, “The State of Texas owns its surface water, and 
this includes the water in the Guadalupe and the San Antonio River 
systems.  Under Texas law, freshwater capture and use is regulated by 
the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), a state 
agency.  Through its permit process and regulatory powers, the TCEQ 
can affect the availability of freshwater to users along the river 
system.”
118
  After the TCEQ refused the Aransas Project’s request that it 
dedicate sufficient instream flow in the San Antonio and Guadalupe 
Rivers to protect the whooping cranes’ habitat, the Aransas Project sued, 
                                                          
 112.  Notice of Public Hearing Regarding Wilderness Study, 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (Mar. 11, 1967).   
 113.  Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, 35 Fed. Reg. 16047 (Oct. 13, 1970). 
 114.  Aransas Project, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 723. 
 115.  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 116.  Id. at 724. 
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Id. at 725.  See also id. at 737–44 (discussing TCEQ’s legal authority under Texas water 
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arguing that the TCEQ’s water management decisions had effectuated a 
“take” of the whooping cranes in violation of Section 9 of the ESA.
119
 
The district court agreed.  First, it concluded: 
that the TCEQ defendants have the authority, power, and responsibility 
to manage water diversions, and the ESA requires that such 
management take into account the health and survival of the AWB 
whooping cranes.  The Court finds further that TCEQ has refused to 
issue a permit to permit freshwater inflow for the protection of the 
AWB habitat and that S.B.3 either by definition or application will not 
protect the winter habitat of the AWB.
120
 
Second, the court upheld the Aransas Project’s theories of factual 
and proximate (legal) causation.
121
  The court’s finding of legal causation 
(proximate causation) was particularly interesting because of the long 
chain of factual connections involved: 
[A]t trial TAP offered essentially uncontroverted evidence to establish: 
(1) the TCEQ defendants are responsible for water permitting and 
water diversions from the San Antonio and Guadalupe River systems, 
and the increased water diversions have left less water for the cranes; 
(2) reduced water flows lead to high bay/estuary salinities (in excess of 
30 to 40 ppt in wide spread sampling); (3) high San Antonio 
bay/Guadalupe estuary salinities lead to a reduction in the availability 
of wolfberries, blue crabs, and fresh drinking water; (4) the reduced 
availability of the cranes’ primary food sources, coupled with the 
expenditure of more energy to fly farther to search for food and 
freshwater, leads to malnourishment and death; and (5) TCEQ 
defendant’s water practices caused the death of at least 23 whooping 
cranes in the 2008–2009 winter.  That is, the mortality of the Whooping 
Crane population is directly attributable to the lack of freshwater 
inflows to these crucian estuaries.
122
 
The district court’s decision is currently on appeal to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
123
 and this extended chain of proximate 
causation is likely to be a key focus of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis. 
Regardless of the Fifth Circuit’s eventual decision, however, this 
case demonstrates how the exercise of state-issued water rights and state 
                                                          
 119.  Id. at 725 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012)). 
 120.  Id. at 743. 
 121.  Id. at 745–75. 
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water management decisions (the refusal to establish an instream flow) 
can come directly into conflict with the ESA.  Here, the exercise of state 
water rights during a drought reduced river flows to the estuary, setting 
off a cascade of chemical, biological, and ecosystem reactions that 
ultimately affected—and allegedly killed—ESA-listed species. 
2. Example #2: The Sacramento–San Joaquin Bay Delta 
The Sacramento–San Joaquin Bay Delta in northern California, also 
known as the California Bay Delta, is created by a confluence of the 
Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and is the home of the massive 
Central Valley Project (CVP, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation) and State 
Water Project (SWP, California).
124
  “Withdrawals of water from the Bay 
Delta provide drinking water to about 25 million Californians and 
irrigation water for about 750,000 acres of crops.”
125
  However, the Bay 
Delta is also home to the Delta smelt (Hypomesus transpacificus), a 




Given the Bureau of Reclamation’s operation of the CVP and the 
presence of the Delta smelt, the CVP is subject to Section 7 of the ESA.  
Despite precipitous declines in the smelt’s populations, however, the 
USFWS in 2005 issued a Biological Opinion that concluded that the 




The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged this 
conclusion on the grounds that the USFWS had not used the best 
available science because, inter alia, it had not considered the effects of 
climate change on the Bay Delta system.
128
  The U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of California agreed,
129
 and on June 1, 2007, it 
granted summary judgment in the NRDC’s favor.
130
 
In light of this decision and trawls in the system in spring 2007 that 
found only twenty-five Delta smelt, “on May 31, 2007, the California 
                                                          
 124.  NRDC v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 328 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
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Department of Water Resources announced that it would stop pumping at 
SWP facilities in order to provide the maximum benefit to the Delta 
smelt.”
131
  In June, the CWP reduced its pumping to about 10% of 
normal, but more Delta smelt deaths resulted.
132
  District Court Judge 
Oliver Wanger’s final injunction in December 2007 reduced the amount 
of water withdrawn from the Bay Delta by about 35%, although he 
eventually (2011) allowed the Bay Delta pumps to operate at 80% of 
normal.
133
  This litigation also prompted a direct (but unsuccessful) 
constitutional attack on the ESA itself, alleging that application of the 
ESA to the intrastate Delta smelt violates the Commerce Clause.
134
 
Perhaps ironically, however, the Ninth Circuit has also decided that a 
number of the Bureau of Reclamation’s water contract renewals for the 
CVP are not subject to Section 7 of the ESA because the Bureau has no 
discretion in the renewal process.
135
  Nevertheless, in combination with 
continued drought and climate change impacts on California’s snow 
pack, Judge Wanger’s 2007 decisions helped to force water rationing 
throughout California.
136
  In particular, farmers previously dependent on 
the CVP and SWP have been coping with drought and reduced water 
deliveries ever since 2007, requiring them to decide how much of what 
kinds of crops to grow, to seek other sources of water such as purchasing 
water or pumping groundwater, and to invest in more water-efficient 
irrigation systems, such as drip irrigation.
137
  Such shortages are 
projected to last at least into 2014, and a zero allocation is possible.
138
 
3. Example #3: The Klamath River 
The Klamath River Basin straddles the Oregon–California border.  In 
1905, Congress authorized the Klamath River Project pursuant to the 
1902 Reclamation Act, and, with the State of Oregon’s full support, the 
U.S., acting through the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, appropriated all 
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necessary Oregon state water rights for the project.
139
  This reclamation 
project provides irrigation water to about 240,000 acres of farms in 
southern Oregon
140
 and consists of a number of dams and reservoirs.
141
  
The main reservoir for the system is Upper Klamath Lake, which is also 
home to two species of fish listed as endangered under the ESA in 1988: 
the Lost River sucker and the short-nosed sucker.
142
  The lowest dam on 
the system, the Iron Gate Dam, blocks the migration of salmon from the 
Pacific Ocean upstream into the rest of the Klamath River system, and as 
a result of this fact and habitat degradation from water diversions, in 
1997 the NMFS listed the Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast 




The Klamath Basin is another system where the courts have deemed 
the exercise of individual water rights to be in direct conflict with the 
ESA, and—as with California’s CVP/SWP—these conflicts have been 
mediated largely through Section 7 because of the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s involvement.  Such conflicts first came to a head in 2000, 
when fishermen and conservation interests filed a lawsuit in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California challenging the 
Bureau’s continued deliveries of irrigation water to farmers under its 
2000 Operations Plan in light of the impacts on the SONCCC salmon.
144
  
The district court concluded that the Bureau of Reclamation had not 
complied with the ESA’s Section 7 formal consultation requirement.
145
  
As a result, the Northern District of California found: 
[T]hat [the] plaintiffs [were] entitled to injunctive relief because the 
Bureau of Reclamations committed a substantial procedural violation 
of the Endangered Species Act in operating Klamath Project for an 
entire year pursuant to its 2000 Operations Plan without completing a 
biological assessment of the likely impact of that plan on the threatened 
coho salmon or its critical habitat, or engaging in consultation as the 
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Act and the regulations specifically required it to do.
146
 
In April 2001, it enjoined the Bureau of Reclamation: 
[F]rom sending irrigation deliveries from Klamath Project whenever 
Klamath River flows at Iron Gate Dam drop below the minimum flows 
recommended in the Hardy Phase I report, until such time as the 
Bureau completes a concrete plan to guide operations in the new water 
year, and consultation concerning that plan is completed, either by (1) 
formal consultation to a “no jeopardy” finding by the NMFS, or (2) the 
Bureau’s final determination, with the written concurrence of the 




As it turned out, 2001 was a severe drought (critically dry) year in the 
region, and, in compliance with the Northern District of California’s 




In addition, the Bureau engaged in proper consultation with the 
USFWS and NMFS, and its 2001 Annual Operation Plan for the Klamath 
Project was based on Biological Opinions from the USFWS and NMFS 
that severely limited irrigation water deliveries in critically dry years in 
order to protect the listed fish.
149
  In response, irrigators sued the U.S. in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon to enjoin the Bureau of 
Reclamation from implementing its 2001 Plan.
150
  The district court, 




While the court sympathizes with plaintiffs and their plight, I am bound 
by oath to uphold the law.  The law requires the protection of suckers 
and salmon as endangered and threatened species and as tribal trust 
resources, even if plaintiffs disagree with the manner in which the fish 
are protected or believe that they inequitably bear the burden of such 
protection. 
The scarcity of water in the Klamath River Basin is a situation likely to 
reoccur.  It is also a situation which demands effort and resolve on the 
part of all parties to create solutions that provide water for the 
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necessary protection of fish, wildlife and tribal trust resources, as well 
as the agricultural needs of farmers and their communities.  Continued 
litigation is not likely to assist in such a challenging endeavor.  This 
court hopes and expects that the parties and other entities necessary to 
long-term solutions will continue to pursue alternatives to meet the 
needs of the Klamath River Basin.
152
 
The Bureau was nevertheless able to again deliver some water to the 
irrigators in July 2001, and “the farmers received about $40 million in 
federal and state disaster aid.”
153
  However, the Northern District of 
California and Ninth Circuit have continued to enjoin irrigation water 




The Klamath Basin, however, may be transitioning to a new balance 
between the ESA and water users.
155
  PacifiCorp operates many of the 
dams in the Klamath Basin for hydropower, and its federal licenses for 
such operations expired in 2006.
156
  The relicensing process through the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is subject to all current 
environmental laws, including the ESA, and PacifiCorp concluded that 
compliance with these statutes was likely to make the dams unprofitable, 
allowing for the possibility of removing the dams.
157
  Moreover, the 
negotiation process for the FERC relicensings brought all of the interests 
in the Klamath Basin together, allowing them to eventually, in 2010, 
negotiate two agreements that would remove four dams and better 
balance water use among the irrigators, tribes, and fish and wildlife 
needs.
158
  Implementation of these agreements now depends on 
Congress—but the irrigators continue to pursue lawsuits against the U.S. 
and Bureau of Reclamation for breach of contract and unconstitutional 




                                                          
 152.  Id. at 1211. 
 153.  ADLER, CRAIG, & HALL, supra note 139, at 635. 
 154.  See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. Civ.C02-
2006 SBA, 2006 WL 798920, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2006), aff’d, 226 Fed. App’x 715 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
 155.  ADLER, CRAIG, & HALL, supra note 139, at 636. 
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  See Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505, 507–08 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(vacating and remanding the Federal Court of Claims’ two decisions for consideration of the Oregon 
courts’ answers); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 532 F.3d 1376, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(on appeal from the Federal Court of Claims’ two decisions, certifying three questions of state water 
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4. Example #4: The Edwards Aquifer 
The Edwards Aquifer is located in central Texas, underlying eight 
Texas counties and acting as the exclusive water supply for the City of 
San Antonio.
160
  It also supplies irrigation water to a number of 
farmers.
161
  The aquifer discharges into the Comal and San Marcos 
Springs, which are home to several ESA-listed species.
162
  “These 
species include the fountain darter (Etheostoma fonticola), the San 
Marcos salamander (Eurycea nana), the San Marcos gambusia 
(Gambusia georgi), the Texas blind salamander (Typhomolge athbuni), 
the Comal Springs dryopid beetle (Stygompamus comalensis), the Comal 
Springs riffle beetle (Heterelmis comalensis), and Texas wild-rice 
(Zizania texana) (collectively, ‘the Edwards species’).”
163
  These species 
have been the subject of litigation since at least 1991, including lawsuits 
against the City of San Antonio alleging that the city’s pumping of the 
aquifer is causing Section 9 takes at the springs
164
 and allegations that 
other individual groundwater pumpers were causing Section 9 takes of 
the listed species.
165
  Thus, the Edwards Aquifer is another water 
resource where individual water rights appear to conflict with ESA-listed 
species. 
However, the Texas Legislature shifted the legal focus of this 
conflict away from ESA preemption to its own innovations in state water 
                                                          
law to the Oregon courts); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677, 683–85 (Fed. 
Cl. 2007) (holding that the sovereign acts doctrine provided the Bureau of Reclamation with a 
complete defense to the breach of contract claims based on its implementation of the ESA); Klamath 
Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 531–35 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (holding that the irrigators 
had only breach of contract claims, not constitutional takings claims), order modified, 68 Fed. Cl. 
119 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (regarding the required status report), certification of interlocutory appeal 
denied, 69 Fed. Cl. 160 (Fed. Cl. 2005); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 328, 
336 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (allowing fishermen’s organization to intervene in the constitutional takings 
litigation); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 227 P.3d 1145, 1169 (Or. 2010) (en banc) 
(concluding, on certification from the Federal Circuit, that irrigators could establish property rights 
in the water despite the United States’ appropriations from the state); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. 
United States, 202 P.3d 159, 165 (Or. 2009) (on certification from the Federal Circuit, accepting 
three questions for resolution under state law). 
 160.  Fred O. Boadu, Bruce M. McCarl, & Dhazn Gillig, An Empirical Investigation of 
Institutional Change in Groundwater Management in Texas: The Edwards Aquifer Case, 47 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 117, 120, 135 (2007). 
 161.  Id. at 120. 
 162.  Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 163.  Shields v. Babbitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 638, 645 (W.D. Tex. 2000), judgment vacated sub nom. 
Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Schuehle v. Norton, 537 U.S. 
1071 (2002).  
 164.  Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 791–92. 
 165.  Shields, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 646–47. 
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law.  In a 1993 ESA-based decision, the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Texas effectively federalized management of the 
Edwards Aquifer unless the State of Texas acted to regulate the aquifer 
in compliance with the ESA.
166
  In an attempt to avoid this federal 
domination of the aquifer,
167
 the Texas Legislature enacted the Edwards 
Aquifer Authority Act in 1993, which the Texas Supreme Court 
unanimously upheld as facially constitutional in 1996.
168
 
The Act creates the Edwards Aquifer Authority, which regulates 
groundwater withdrawals from the aquifer.
169
  Specifically: 
The Act imposes an aquifer-wide cap on water withdrawals by non-
exempt wells of 450,000 acre-feet of water per year through the year 
2007 and 400,000 acre-feet per year thereafter.  The Authority can 
increase the withdrawal caps if it determines that additional water 
supplies are safely available from the aquifer.  The Authority will 
allocate these caps among wells by a permit system.  However, all 
wells producing no more than 25,000 gallons of water a day for 
domestic or livestock purposes are exempt from the permit system and 
the caps.  This exemption allows all landowners, except those within or 
serving a platted subdivision, to drill wells for household purposes, 
watering animals, or irrigating a family garden.
170
 
While the permitting program gives deference to existing users of water 




The Edwards Aquifer story demonstrates that conflicts between state 
water rights and the ESA can alter state water law through mechanisms 
other than federal preemption.  It also demonstrates that water rights 
holders who view those water rights as absolute property rights can 
extend litigation about ESA-conflicted water resources for decades.  
                                                          
 166.  See Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069, 1993 WL 151353, at *33–35 (W.D. Tex. 
Feb. 1, 1993). 
 167.  Catherine Bennett, Groundwater Rights and the Endangered Species Act: Potential ESA 
Suits When S.B. 332 Is Implemented, 42 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 151, 163–65 (2012); Matthew Carson 
Cottingham Miles, Water Wars: A Discussion of the Edwards Aquifer Water Crisis, 6 S.C. ENVTL. 
L.J. 213, 225–27 (1997) (tracing the creation of the Edwards Aquifer Authority to the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Texas’s 1993 decision in Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-
069, 1993 WL 151353, at *8–9 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1993)). 
 168.  Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1997); Barshop v. Medina 
Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex. 1996). 
 169.  Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 624. 
 170.  Id. (citing Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 626, §§ 1.03(9), 1.14(b), (c), (d), 
1.16(c), 1.33, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2355, as amended by Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 
261, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2505).  
 171.  Id. at 624 & n.2. 
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Existing water users who have either been denied permits or been issued 
permits to pump reduced amounts of water from the Edwards Aquifer 
have sued continuously to stop implementation of the Act.
172
  Moreover, 
while the Edwards Aquifer Authority has continued to issue permits, the 
Texas Court of Appeals in August 2013 deemed the Authority’s limited 
permits to be an unconstitutional taking of landowners’ rights to 
groundwater without compensation.
173
  The court amended its opinion—
but not its conclusion—in November 2013.
174
 
5. Beyond Specific Examples: A Nationwide Snapshot of ESA-Water 
Law Conflicts 
As the discussions throughout this Part indicate, water management 
in a number of water basins in the U.S., both East and West, depends at 
least in part on the ESA.  Many of these water systems, moreover, have 
witnessed repeated and significant conflicts between human water use 
and management and the demands of the ESA, leading in several systems 
to reduced human water use and direct impacts on individual state-law 
and contractual water rights. 
Such conflicts are likely only to increase in the future.  First, as the 
Eastern District of California insisted for the Sacramento–San Joaquin 
Bay Delta, climate change is increasingly affecting water supplies in 
various parts of the U.S., generally for the worse.  Climate change 
impacts include reduced rain, reduced snowpack, earlier snowmelt, and 
severe storm events preceded and followed by drought and are likely to 
be worst in the West.
175
  Increasing water temperatures and reduced 
flows have already affected energy production throughout the U.S., and 
coastal water supplies in places like Florida are already experiencing 
salt-water intrusion that sea-level rise will only exacerbate.
176
  As climate 
                                                          
 172.  E.g., Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 274 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. App. 2008), aff’d, 369 S.W.3d 
814 (Tex. 2012); In re Edwards Aquifer Auth., 217 S.W.3d 581 (Tex. App. 2006); Edwards Aquifer 
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Auth. v. Bragg, No. 04-11-00018-CV, 2013 WL 5989430 (Tex. App. Nov. 13, 2013). 
 174.  Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, No. 04-11-00018-CV, 2013 WL 5989430, at *14–22 
(Tex. App. Nov. 13, 2013). 
 175.  Water Resources: Climate Impacts on Water Resources, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climate 
change/impacts-adaptation/water.html (last updated Sept. 9, 2013). 
 176.  Id. 
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change continues to alter water systems, it will increasingly stress both 
human water use and the other species that depend on the water, 
increasing the potential for ESA-water conflicts. 
At the same time, the population of the U.S. is growing, especially in 
cities.  Researchers reported in 2008 that “[t]he U.S. population now 
exceeds 300 million, and it is projected to almost double in the next 50 
years.”
177
  In addition, the populations of most major cities will probably 
increase by at least 50% by 2030.
178
  These increasing population 
pressures are second only to climate change across a variety of scenarios 
in their ability to increase water stress throughout the U.S.,
179
 again 
presaging increasing ESA-water conflicts. 
Other factors can contribute to future ESA-water conflicts.  
Increasing populations in cities, for example, means increased 
conversion of farms, wetlands, and forests to urban and suburban uses, 
which can affect both water availability and water quality.
180
  In addition, 
water users are overpumping (“mining”) many of the nation’s 
underground aquifers, threatening that source of water supply, reducing 
or eliminating alternatives to the surface water systems that species 
mostly depend upon, reducing or eliminating groundwater-fed surface 
waters, and causing land subsidence.
181
  Both of these trends, like climate 
change and population changes, are likely to exacerbate existing ESA-
water conflicts. 
The Aransas Project decision, therefore, is likely to be the first of 
many where courts are forced to decide the exact relationship between 
state water law and private water rights, on the one hand, and the ESA’s 
requirements, on the other.  To date, the legal relationship between the 
ESA and state water law has mostly been submerged (pun intended) 
because ESA-water conflicts have generally arisen in the context of 
federal water projects, with federal agencies holding state water rights, 
and hence have been mediated by the operations of Section 7.  The 
question of federal preemption never arises: the federal agency holds 
state water rights pursuant to one federal statute (the Reclamation Act, 
                                                          
 177.  Ge Sun et al., Impacts of Climate Change, Population Growth, Land Use Change, and 
Groundwater Availability on Water Supply and Demand Across the Conterminus U.S., 6 
WATERSHED UPDATE 2, 3 (May-Aug. 2008), available at http://awra.org/committees/techcom/water 
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 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 26. 
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 181.  ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF 
AMERICA’S FRESH WATERS 24–34, 209–24 (2002). 
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dam authorizing legislation, etc.) and must comply with another federal 
statute, the ESA, in exercising them.  Moreover, as a practical matter, the 
Section 7 consultation process can often mitigate conflicts that exist 
between the exercise of the federal agency’s water rights and species 
protections, either through reasonable and prudent alternatives or 
Incidental Take Statements or both. 
However, as the Aransas Project illustrates, in water systems without 
(or at least not dominated by) federal water projects, exercise of state 
water rights by state government agencies, municipalities, and private 
entities can also create conflicts with ESA-listed species.  Where there is 
no federal involvement, moreover, these conflicts necessarily arise under 
ESA Section 9.  As such, the exercise of state water rights in these 
circumstances directly pits a state law property right against a federal law 
prohibition.  Federal preemption thus becomes the logical legal 
framework for analyzing these conflicts, especially in the absence of a 
Section 10 permit, and it is to that framework that this Article now turns. 
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION: AN OVERVIEW 
Federal preemption derives from the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause, which states that “[t]he Constitution and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the Supreme 
Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
182
  As many courts have pointed out, 
“The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution . . . invalidates state laws 
that ‘interfere with, or are contrary to,’ federal law.”
183
  However, out of 
respect for the states, the U.S. Supreme Court begins its preemption 
analyses with a presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt 
state law, particularly in areas—like wildlife regulation—that 
traditionally have been the states’ prerogative.
184
 
There are three main ways in which federal law can nevertheless 
preempt state law.  First, Congress can expressly preempt state law
185
—
for example, by explicitly stating in a federal statute that certain kinds of 
                                                          
 182.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 183.  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 851 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Hillsborough 
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state laws are preempted.
186
 
Second, Congress can implicitly preempt state law.  Implicit 
preemption analysis is the most complex kind of preemption analysis 
because the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized several different kinds 
of implicit preemption.  Most sweeping is field preemption, where “[t]he 
scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it”—
i.e., that Congress “occupies the field.”
187
  For example, the Supreme 
Court has held that the Natural Gas Act of 1938 occupies the field of 
interstate natural gas regulation because it is a “comprehensive scheme” 




Similarly, when federal interests dominate over state interests, the 
courts will often hold that federal law implicitly preempts state law.
189
  
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the federal 
government’s interest in claims of fraud on the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is so 
strongly federal that it preempts state common law fraud claims on the 
same subject.
190
  Similarly, Congress has a long history of preempting 
state law when it comes to regulating sea-going vessels and naval 
warships, because both navigation on the high seas and national defense 
are considered pervasive federal interests.
191
 
In a third type of implicit preemption, courts will find that federal 
law implicitly preempts state law if the state law gets in the way of the 
federal law.  More specifically, preemption occurs if “the object sought 
to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations 
imposed by it . . . reveal” Congress’s intent to preempt state law.
192
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Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942)); Ray, 435 U.S. at 157. 
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 189.  See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm’n, 531 U.S. 341, 351–52 (2001). 
 190.  Id. at 347–48. 
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 192.  Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (citing S. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 439, 446 (1915); 
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Thus, for example, not only did the federal government have a strong 
interest in fraud-on-the-FDA cases, but, under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, “the federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA 
to punish and deter fraud against the Administration,” and “[t]he balance 
sought by the Administration can be skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-
FDA claims under state tort law.”
193
 
Finally, the courts have recognized conflict preemption as the 
irreducible form of federal preemption.  Under conflict preemption, 
“[e]ven if Congress has not completely foreclosed state legislation in a 
particular area, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts 
with a valid federal statute.”
194
  Importantly, “neither an express pre-




Nevertheless, conflict preemption does create the issue of how to 
identify an “actual conflict” between state and federal law.  Federal 
courts find that such conflicts exist primarily in two situations.  First, a 
conflict exists “where compliance with both federal and state regulations 
is a physical impossibility . . . .”
196
  Second, a conflict between state and 
federal law exists if the state “law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”
197
  “What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to 
be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying 
its purpose and intended effects . . . .”
198
 
Thus, courts enjoy considerable discretion in discerning such 
“obstacles,” but some conflicts between state and federal law are 
nevertheless fairly obvious.  For example, federal bankruptcy law 
generally gives first priority to federal claims.
199
  When an Ohio 
bankruptcy statute ranked federal claims fifth in priority, it clearly 
                                                          
(1926)); Ray, 435 U.S. at 157–58. 
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 198.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). 
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conflicted with federal bankruptcy law and was preempted.
200
 
IV. THE ESA’S PREEMPTION OF STATE WATER LAW 
A. Express Preemption of State Law by the ESA 
The ESA expressly preempts state law in certain circumstances.  
Specifically, Section 6(f) of the Act states that: 
Any State law or regulation which applies with respect to the 
importation or exportation of, or interstate or foreign commerce in, 
endangered species or threatened species is void to the extent that it 
may effectively (1) permit what is prohibited by this chapter or by any 
regulation which implements this chapter, or (2) prohibit what is 
authorized pursuant to an exemption or permit provided for in this 
chapter or in any regulation which implements this chapter.  This 
chapter shall not otherwise be construed to void any State law or 
regulation which is intended to conserve migratory, resident, or 
introduced fish or wildlife, or to permit or prohibit sale of such fish or 
wildlife.  Any State law or regulation respecting the taking of an 
endangered species or threatened species may be more restrictive than 
the exemptions or permits provided for in this chapter or in any 
regulation which implements this chapter but not less restrictive than 
the prohibitions so defined.
201
 
Courts have concluded that this section constitutes an express declaration 
of congressional intent to have the ESA preempt state law.
202
  Although 
the provision expressly allows states to continue to regulate—and hence 
simultaneously operates as a “savings clause”—states cannot “relax 




Most of the case law involving the ESA’s express preemption 
provision has involved state laws governing species conservation, 
hunting, trapping, fishing, and international trade in fish and wildlife—
subjects, in other words, to which the ESA directly speaks.  Moreover, 
these cases closely hew to Section 6(f)’s double action as an express 
preemption provision and savings clause. 
                                                          
 200.  U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 493–94 (1993). 
 201.  16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) (2012). 
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1. Section 6(f) as a Savings Clause: Non-Preemption by the ESA 
To perhaps state the obvious, and to underscore the importance of 
the Section 4 listing process, the ESA does not preempt any state or local 
regulation that does not affect a listed species.
204
  Thus, “with respect to 
unlisted species, section 6(f) leaves undisturbed the states’ broad 
traditional regulatory authority.”
205
  Moreover, in the absence of 
evidence showing a continuing intent to preempt state law, states re-
acquire authority to regulate previously listed species—including trade in 
those species—after the USFWS or NMFS de-lists them.
206
 
With respect to listed species, under Section 6(f), state laws can be 
more protective than the ESA without being preempted.  Thus, for 
example, when the State of Florida imposed stricter penalties than the 
ESA for killing Florida panthers, an endangered species, the Florida 
Court of Appeals held that the ESA did not preempt state law, reasoning 
that: 
[T]he Endangered Species Act and the regulations promulgated 
pursuant thereto do not specifically preempt state law in the 
conservation area.  Only state laws that allow actions that the federal 
law precludes are prohibited.  Consequently, the Florida legislature, 
which has the right to prohibit the killing of the Florida panther, has 
properly imposed stricter penalties which the Endangered Species Act 
allows states to do.
207
 
Similarly, the ESA did not preempt New York’s Wild Bird Law, which 
prohibited the sale of live wild birds unless they were born and raised in 
captivity, because dealers in New York had no federal license or permit 
to sell wild-caught ESA-listed species.
208
 
In addition, under Section 6(f), state laws regarding ESA-listed 
species can also address different concerns than what the ESA addresses, 
so long as the resulting state law is not less restrictive than the ESA, does 
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not permit trade in the species that the ESA would prohibit, and does not 
prohibit trade in the species that the ESA would allow.  For example, the 
town of Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, enacted an ordinance that 
“prohibit[ed] the possession of any ‘vicious or dangerous domesticated 
animal or any other animal . . . of wild, vicious or dangerous 
propensities.’  The ordinance specifically makes it unlawful to possess 
wolves within the Town.”
209
  Wolves are also an endangered species 
under the ESA, and people who wanted to keep wolves in their homes 
challenged the ordinance, claiming that the ESA preempted it.
210
  The 
South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed, finding the ordinance and the 
ESA largely inapposite: 
The stated purpose of [the ESA] is to preserve the habitat of 
endangered species and provide a program for their conservation.  The 
stated purpose of the local ordinance is to regulate the care and control 
of animals within the town limits to protect the safety, health and 
general welfare of the community.  Under the [ESA] a permit can be 
obtained to possess endangered animals.  The ordinance does not run 
contrary to the permitting of animals, but regulates the conditions under 
which certain animals can be kept in the town.  Furthermore, the [ESA] 
provides that any state law respecting taking of endangered species 




2. Section 6(f) Express Preemption 
Section 6(f)’s provisions regarding international and interstate trade 
in ESA-listed species essentially prohibit states and local governments 
from enacting any laws or regulations that differ from federal law.  As a 
result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the ESA 
and regulations promulgated thereunder expressly preempted a 
California statute
212
 prohibiting trade of any elephant products because 
                                                          
 209.  Peoples Program for Endangered Species v. Sexton, 476 S.E.2d 477, 479 (S.C. 1996).  
“Exceptions are provided for private non-profit organizations established for educational purposes if: 
1) the location conforms to the provisions of the Town’s zoning code; 2) animals are kept in clean 
and sanitary conditions; 3) animals are maintained in quarters to prevent their escape; and 4) no 
person lives or resides within 200 feet of the animals’ quarters.”  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 480. 
 211.  Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) (1985)). 
 212.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 653o(a) (West 1983) (“It is unlawful to import into this state for 
commercial purposes, to possess with intent to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any 
part or product thereof, of any polar bear, leopard, ocelot, tiger, cheetah, jaguar, sable antelope, wolf 
(Canis lupus), zebra, whale, cobra, python, sea turtle, colobus monkey, kangaroo, vicuna, sea otter, 
free-roaming feral horse, dolphin or porpoise (Delphinidae), Spanish lynx, or elephant.”). 
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the ESA regulations allowed for limited trade in African elephant 
products under special federal permits.
213
  An importer of African 
elephant ivory with a federal permit brought suit seeking declaratory 
relief that federal law preempted the state statute.
214
  In determining 
congressional intent, the Ninth Circuit noted that the ESA allows for 
state regulation of trade in species so long as the statute does not prohibit 
what the ESA and its implementing regulations permit.
215
  However, 
when the African elephant was added to the endangered species list, an 
accompanying regulation allowed for a special purpose permit 
“authorizing any activity otherwise prohibited.”
216
  California’s outright 
ban on elephant products therefore prohibited what the ESA allowed and 
hence was expressly preempted.
217
 
Courts have also repeatedly found that the ESA preempts state law 
protections for endangered and threatened species when the state law is 
less protective than the ESA.  For example, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Montana concluded that the ESA expressly preempted 
Montana’s definition of a “taking,” which did not include “habitat 
modifications,” even though Montana was a party to a “full-authority 
comparative agreement” under the ESA.
218
 The court reasoned that: 
[T]he clear language of § 6(f) of the ESA combined with the 
overwhelming priority Congress has given to the preservation of 
                                                          
 213.  50 C.F.R. § 17.40(e) (1981) (allowing trade in African elephant products under special 
federal permits). 
 214.  Man Hing Ivory & Imports, Inc. v. Deukmejian, 702 F.2d 760, 761 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 215.  Id. at 763. 
 216.  Id. at 764 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(e)(3) (1981) (“A special purpose permit may be issued 
in accordance with the provisions of § 17.32 authorizing any activity otherwise prohibited with 
regard to such wildlife, upon submission of proof that such wildlife was already in the United States 
on June 11, 1978 or that such wildlife was imported into the United States in accordance with 
paragraph (e)(2) of this section.”)). 
 217.  Id. at 765 (“We affirm the district court’s well-considered judgment that section 6(f) [sic] 
of the Endangered Species Act, together with 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(e), preempts California’s statutory 
prohibition on trade in African elephant products by a trader who has secured all necessary federal 
permits.”).  See also H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Deukmejian, 702 F.2d 758, 759–60 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that the ESA preempted California’s prohibitions on trade in African elephant parts because 
federal law regulated such trade, but the ESA did not preempt California’s prohibitions on trade in 
Indonesian pythons or Wallabee kangaroos, because those species were not listed under the ESA); 
Foulke Co. v. Brown, 463 F. Supp. 1142, 1144–45 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that the ESA 
preempted California’s prohibitions on trade in the American alligator when federal law allowed 
such trade).  For a comprehensive discussion of ESA preemption and state laws banning commerce 
in certain species, see generally Tony Phillips, Note, Federal Preemption of State Commerce Bans 
Under the Endangered Species Act, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1323 (1982). 
 218.  Swan View Coal., Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (D. Mont. 1992) (internal 
quotations marks omitted). 
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threatened and endangered species, [means] the court must conclude 
that the less restrictive takings provisions under Montana law are 
preempted by the ESA and that the definition of “take” under the ESA 
which includes “harm” and “significant habitat modification” is 
controlling in this case.
219
 
Other courts have found, however, that Section 6(f) express preemption 
cannot be assessed if the federal government has not enacted a standard 
for species protection directly comparable to the state or local law at 
issue, such as lighting prohibitions for listed sea turtles.
220
 
Following this logic, cases involving water management can invoke 
the ESA’s express preemption provision, but generally only if the 
relevant state law relates directly to the protection of species and directly 
conflicts with an extant federal standard for protection.  For example, in 
United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District,
221
 the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of California confronted a situation in 
which the irrigation district’s diversions of water from the Sacramento 
River had a well-documented history of causing harm to the ESA-listed 
Sacramento River winter-run chinook salmon as a result of salmon being 
killed or injured in the diversion’s pumps.  Starting in 1920, courts 
ordered the irrigation district to install fish screens to protect fish from 
being drawn into pumps.
222
  The district’s failure to regularly maintain 
the screens resulted in periodic litigation, and the California Department 
of Fish and Game ended up installing the fish screens at issue in 1972.
223
  
The main issue for the Eastern District of California was who was 
responsible for the taking of the listed salmon—the irrigation district 
because of its pumping, or California because of the screens that it 
installed.  The court found the irrigation district liable because the 
screens presented no hazard in absence of the pumping.
224
 
Along the way, however, the district court effectively found that 
federal definitions of causation and “take” had to govern the litigation, 
                                                          
 219.  Id. 
 220.  See Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty., Fla., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1308 
n.19 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (“Plaintiffs do not argue that the ESA preempts the County’s ordinance.  
While it is true that to the extent a state’s regulation of ‘taking’ is less protective than the Act, it is 
preempted; see U.S. v. Glenn–Colusa Irr. Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992); such 
preemption is inapplicable here since the Secretary has not promulgated a lighting ordinance to 
which the County’s can be compared.”). 
 221.  788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
 222.  Id. at 1129. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. at 1133. 
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because “to the extent that California’s law . . . is less protective than the 
Endangered Species Act, it is preempted.”
225
  As a result, the district 
court rejected California’s definition of proximate cause, which uses a 
substantial factor test, for assessing the “taking” of species, because it 
was less protective than the federal definition.
226
 
B. Implied Field Preemption by the ESA 
As noted, courts occasionally deem Congress to have “occupied the 
field” through federal regulation, excluding states from regulating on the 
same subject.  However, because the ESA’s express preemption 
provision allows states to regulate more stringently (i.e., to be more 
protective of species) than the ESA itself requires, courts have held that 
the ESA generally does not occupy the field of species protection.
227
  As 
a result, state water managers and state water law remain generally free 
to provide more protection (e.g., instream flows, habitat restoration) than 
the ESA might otherwise require. 
On occasion, however, the ESA in combination with other federal 
statutes has been held to occupy the field with respect to particular 
species.  For example, in In Defense of Animals v. Cleveland Metroparks 
Zoo,
228
 plaintiffs challenged the planned move of a male lowland gorilla 
from Ohio to the Bronx Zoo for mating purposes.  The U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the plaintiffs’ state law 
claims had to be dismissed because the ESA’s preemption provisions, 
regulations implementing the ESA, and the federal Animal Welfare Act 
of 1970
229
 together wholly occupy the field of law regulating the 
transportation of ESA-listed lowland gorillas across state lines.
230
 
In the context of water law, it is unlikely that any federal statute 
would generally preempt the field of state water law, especially given 
                                                          
 225.  Id. at 1134. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  See H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Brown, 519 F. Supp. 1383, 1389 (E.D. Cal. 1981), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 702 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983) 
(“[T]his Court must find that Congress did not intend to preempt California Penal Code ss 653o and 
653r, except to the extent that those sections prohibit what is authorized by a permit or exemption 
issued pursuant to the Act or its regulations.”). 
 228.  785 F. Supp. 100 (N.D. Ohio 1991). 
 229.  7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2012). 
 230.  In Defense of Animals, 785 F. Supp. at 102.  Compare with Viva! Int’l Voice for Animals 
v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., 162 P.3d 569, 577 (Cal. 2007) (holding that the ESA 
does not occupy the field with respect to the import and sale of kangaroos). 
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Congress’s traditional and repeated solicitude toward state water law.
231
  
Nevertheless, with regard to specific and heavily federally managed river 
systems, the combination of the ESA and federal water management 
statutes and federal water management plans could effectively preempt 
state efforts on the same river.  As one illustrative non-water rights 
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ management of the Missouri River, 
which is dictated by the federal Flood Control Act and to a lesser extent 
by the federal Clean Water Act, is exempt from the requirements that 
state water quality standards would otherwise impose on the system.
232
 
C. The ESA and Conflict Preemption of State Water Law 
Conflict preemption, as noted above, is the minimum constitutional 
import of the Supremacy Clause.  Thus, to the extent that state law 
actually conflicts with federal law, either generally or in a specific 
application, the state law will be preempted. 
Distinguishing ESA conflict preemption from ESA express 
preemption can be difficult, because Section 6(f) expressly preempts 
state laws in conflict with the ESA.  As a result, although the line 
between express and conflict preemption can be thin, courts usually 
apply conflict preemption principles when assessing the validity of state 
and local government laws that do not directly regulate or affect ESA-
listed species, concluding that the ESA can preempt conflicting state 




For example, when fishing regulations in Massachusetts that 
governed non-listed species allowed fishers to set lobster traps in ways 
that caused “takes” of listed and endangered Northern right whales, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the ESA preempted 
                                                          
 231.  Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting Water Federalism to Climate Change Impacts: Energy 
Policy, Food Security, and the Allocation of Water Resources, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 
183, 188–89, 194–97 (2010); see generally Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: 
National Interests vs. State Authority under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 
241 (2006). 
 232.  In re Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig., 418 F.3d 915, 917–20 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 233.  Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 168 (1st Cir. 1997) (“By including the states in the group of 
actors subject to the Act’s prohibitions, Congress implicitly intended to preempt any action of a state 
inconsistent with and in violation of the ESA.”); Aransas Project v. Shaw, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 783 
(S.D. Tex. 2013) (“State agency regulations, to the extent they conflict with the ESA, are preempted, 
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.” (citation omitted)). 
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the state licensing rules.
234
  By creating a situation where lines and 
fishing gear would be placed in the whales’ paths, promoting 
entanglements and harm to (or even deaths of) those whales, the 
Massachusetts fishing licenses posed an obstacle to the ESA’s objective 
of protecting the Northern right whale from harm.  Specifically, the First 
Circuit concluded that: 
By including the states in the group of actors subject to the Act’s 
prohibitions, Congress implicitly intended to preempt any action of a 
state inconsistent with and in violation of the ESA.  We agree with the 
district court that the Commonwealth’s regulation of commercial 
fishing likely results in a taking in violation of the far-reaching 
prohibitions of the ESA.  The district court properly concluded that the 
scheme as it presently operates cannot continue insofar as its operation 
is inconsistent with the intent of the ESA.
235
 
Similarly, in 1998, California voters passed an initiative that made it 
illegal (and criminal) to use certain animal traps and poisons, including 
steel-jawed leghold traps.
236
  Federal agencies, however, used such traps 
to protect threatened and endangered species.
237
  The Ninth Circuit held 
that the ESA preempted California’s complete ban on the use of these 
traps because the ban prohibited any person, including federal agencies, 
from using traps and poisons for any reason.
238
  Because there was no 
exception for endangered species, the California initiative precluded 
federal agencies from protecting endangered species under the ESA as 
the ESA requires, creating a conflict between federal and state law.
239
 
Conflict preemption is thus the most likely mode of preemption 
analysis that a court will use when the state or local regulation at issue 
has nothing directly to do with ESA-listed species—or even species 
regulation at all.  For example, when the City of South San Francisco 
amended a residential land use development plan for San Bruno 
Mountain in order to comply with the ESA, the California Court of 
                                                          
 234.  Strahan, 127 F.3d at 168. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 3003.1–.2, 12005.5 (West 1998). 
 237.  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 844, opinion amended on denial of 
reh’g, 312 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 238.  Id. at 852, 859. 
 239.  See id. at 853 (“We do not read [16 U.S.C. § 1535(f)] to carve out an exception to the ESA 
that would allow the state to conserve wildlife that is not endangered . . . .”).  See also Pac. Nw. 
Venison Producers v. Smitch, No. C92–1076WD, 1992 WL 613294, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 2, 
1992) aff’d in part, 20 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the ESA expressly preempted a 
Washington state law that would have prohibited propagation of the ESA-listed sika deer). 
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Appeals held that “[f]orcing a developer to submit an amendment to the 
referendum process . . . conflicts with overriding federal authority.”
240
  
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the ESA preempted a 
Boundary County ordinance requiring that the county concur before 
adjustments to uses of federal lands could occur.
241
  According to the 
court, the county’s purported “veto authority”: 
[I]s contrary to the provisions of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1543 (1985 & Supp. 1995), which authorizes the 
Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary 
of Agriculture to acquire land to carry out the purposes of the Act.  16 
U.S.C. § 1534.  It is also contrary to the portion of the Endangered 
Species Act which requires the Secretary of the Interior and the 
Secretary of Commerce to develop and implement recovery plans for 
endangered species.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(f).  This veto power stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives 
Congress evidenced in these federal laws.
242
 
As such, conflict preemption is likely to be the most important form 
of ESA preemption analysis in the water resource and water rights 
contexts.  Unlike state fish and game laws, state laws regarding water 
rights and water management generally do not directly regulate species; 
moreover, to the extent that these laws address species or biodiversity, 
they generally act to preserve aquatic species.  As a result, the ESA’s 
express preemption provision is unlikely to be relevant.  Nevertheless, 
because implementation of water rights and water management measures 
can directly affect aquatic species’ habitat and food supplies, they can 
become obstacles to the protection and recovery of particular listed 
species. 
The Southern District of Texas’s March 2013 decision in Aransas 
Project v. Shaw
243
 exemplifies the potential importance of conflict 
preemption when water management interferes with ESA-listed species.  
Indeed, as important as—although far less detailed than—the court’s 
findings on Section 9 causation was its unflinching and repeated 
conclusion that the ESA trumped state water law in the face of conflict.  
Thus, for example, when the defendants suggested that Texas’s new (and 
arguably improved) water legislation, S.B.3, displaced the need for this 
case, the court concluded that: 
                                                          
 240.  W. W. Dean & Assocs. v. City of South S.F., 190 Cal. App. 3d 1368, 1379 (1987). 
 241.  Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary Cnty., 913 P.2d 1141, 1147–48 (Idaho 1996). 
 242.  Id. at 1147. 
 243.  930 F. Supp. 2d 716 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
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[T]o suggest that S.B.3 can protect the whooping cranes, when by its 
own admission, it specifically excludes the cranes’ habitat in times of 
water emergencies, is to argue that state law preempts federal law.  
This topsy-turvy view of federalism and the Constitution’s Supremacy 




The fact that those diversions [from the Guadalupe and San Antonio 
Rivers] were “lawful water diversions under preexisting permits” is 
irrelevant in the context of this case because, as previously discussed, 
the ESA preempts state law to the extent it authorizes activities that 
cause a prohibited take of a listed species.
245
 
Again, as a finding of law, “The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, ensures that Section 9 of the ESA 
preempts contrary state regulations and other state laws.”
246
 
Thus, despite the fact that the Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality (TCEQ) issued water rights largely independently of species 
considerations, the cumulative exercise of the water rights it issued could 
affect ESA-listed species.  Moreover, in the face of the court’s finding 
that there was an actual conflict between the implementation of Texas 
water law (issuance of prior appropriation rights and refusal to curtail 
those rights in the face of drought) and the ESA (the whooping cranes’ 
need for viable habitat and food supplies), federal conflict preemption 
dictated the outcome of the case.  Aransas Project should be considered 
a harbinger of outcomes for the many non-federally mediated ESA-water 
rights conflicts to come. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
Given the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause and the established 
ability of state water law to conflict with federal law requirements to 
protect ESA-listed species, the ESA’s continued preemption of state 
water rights is inevitable.  Just as inevitable, as the litigation histories of 
the Klamath Basin and Edwards Aquifer indicate, are follow-on lawsuits 
arguing that the federal government has taken vested property rights 
without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. 
                                                          
 244.  Id. at 737. 
 245.  Id. at 745. 
 246.  Id. at 783. 
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It is tempting, from both the property rights and environmentalist 
sides of the debate, to portray this litigious seesaw between the 
Supremacy Clause’s constitutional mandate and the Fifth Amendment’s 
constitutional protection of property rights as a legal tragedy in need of 
reform.  However, it is also important to remember two things about 
conflicts between state water law and the ESA: (1) the Fifth Amendment 
problem arises only in states that characterize private water rights as 
absolute property rights, which is generally true only in the Mountain 
West and non-coastal southwest states; and (2) even in those states, a 
tunnel-vision focus on ESA-water conflicts obscures the larger problems 
surrounding water management.  ESA-listed water-dependent species are 
the proverbial canaries in these aquatic mines, warning that the relevant 
states have larger water resource problems facing them. 
To expand briefly on point (1), few states view water rights as 
absolute property rights.  Over half the states (mostly in the East) base 
their surface water rights on common law riparianism, under which water 
rights have always been subject to the doctrine of reasonable use and the 
evolving needs of other water users, rendering all water rights contextual 
and subject to change.  “Regulated riparian” states—eastern states like 
Florida that have adopted permit programs for water rights—maintain 
this common law flexibility through time limits on permits and other 
mechanisms.  Similarly, the groundwater doctrines employed in the 
majority of states—reasonable use and correlative rights—also define 
water rights to be flexible and contextual. 
Even among the minority of states that use prior appropriation for 
surface water or groundwater rights (or the rule of capture for 
groundwater), many have declined to figure water rights as absolute 
property.  Most famously, states like California and Hawaii subject water 
rights to both a strong public trust doctrine and a plethora of permit 
conditions, both of which allow these states to adjust water rights as 
circumstances (such as species’ needs) demand. 
Water rights in most states, in other words, can (and under the 
Supremacy Clause, must) accommodate the ESA when there is an 
absolute conflict between human water use and the mandated 
requirements for listed species, and no Fifth Amendment taking should 
thus result from implementing the ESA’s protections.  Even in those 
prior appropriation states that declare water rights to be absolute property 
rights, however, inherent limitations on water rights do exist: the rule of 
priority, which limits more junior rights by the prior demands of more 
senior rights; the doctrines of abandonment and forfeiture, which 
eliminate or reduce vested water rights for non-use; and the common law 
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doctrine of public necessity, which allows governments to destroy 
private property without compensation during emergencies.  Thus, even 
in these states it is not always clear that conflict preemption by the ESA 
necessarily takes private water rights in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment, particularly if the water rights holders have not bothered to 
apply for a Section 10 Incidental Take Permit, the issuance of which (and 
its accompanying Habitat Conservation Plan) would legally 
accommodate both the water rights and the ESA-listed species.  Notably, 
the Southern District of Texas in Aransas Project chose to require the 
TCEQ to apply for a Section 10 permit as its prescribed remedy for the 
ESA-water rights conflict. 
Nevertheless, too intense a focus on ESA preemption in water 
resource management is almost certainly counterproductive.  Notably, 
most litigated ESA-water rights conflicts to date have arisen in the 
context of drought.  The identification of “drought” allows the immediate 
resolutions of the ESA litigation to be conceived of as temporary fixes 
that will disappear when everything “goes back to normal,” undermining 
the ESA’s arguably more important role as a more general alarm signal 
for particular aquatic systems.  Nevertheless, as human populations grow 
and shift, climate change increasingly impacts water resources and their 
related ecosystems, aquifers run dry, the increasing quantification and 
exercise of tribal reserved water rights subordinate long-existing 
appropriative rights, and other factors increase the stresses to particular 
water systems, more far-reaching accommodations among water users 
(including aquatic ecosystems) will be needed than ESA preemption can 
provide.  For the future, therefore, ESA preemption of state water law is 
probably much better viewed not as a quirk of particularly severe 
drought years but rather as a signal that particular water systems need 
substantially revised management—revisions that go far beyond either 
the ESA or state water law. 
 
